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I.

INTRODUCTION

The early seventies witnessed a frenetic period of litigation to overturn
those state school finance systems which produced wealth-related disparities
in per pupil spending among districts within a state. Litigation also
stimulated and, in some cases, forced state legislatures to pass new school
finance laws. This period of judicial activity began in late 1971 when the
California Supreme Court, in Serrano v. Priest,1 held that it was a violation
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution for the quality of a child's education to be "a function of
the wealth of his parents and neighbors. '"2 For eighteen months, school
finance systems in state after state were challenged on the basis of the
"fiscal neutrality" theory which the Serrano court had articulated. This
theory proved to be a successful litigation strategy until the Supreme Court's
decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez3 in the
spring of 1973, holding that a school finance system which produced
relative differences in educational opportunities among school districts did
not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Thus the litigative efforts to challenge school finance systems under the
fourteenth amendment ground to a halt. However, a new phase of school
finance reform litigation, based on state constitutional provisions, began
when the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down its decision in Robinson
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 1956, Bryn Mawr College; L.L.B. 1966, Yale
University. The research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation.
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2. Id. at 589, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
3. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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v. Cahill4 less than a month after Rodriguez was decided. The Robinson
court held that New Jersey's school financing system violated that provision
of the state constitution which commands the legislature to provide a
"thorough and efficient system of free public schools." 5 The message was
conveyed that even though the federal courts were closed, state courts
offered an alternative forum for school finance reform litigation.
This commentary focuses on the issue of the continuing vitality of the
school finance reform movement, inquiring first into those cases which have
attempted to transfer the fiscal neutrality theory from the federal equal
protection clause to various state constitutional provisions. Other factors,
such as diminished state fiscal surpluses, declining enrollments, pressures
for property tax relief and increased demands for funds for certain types of
"disadvantaged" pupil populations are also examined to assess their impact
on finance reform efforts. Finally, the effect of the legal "backlash"-challenges brought by those school districts which did not benefit by the
reforms enacted in the early seventies-is evaluated. Although the development of an increasing variety of judicial definitions of "equal educational
opportunity" is discussed, no attempt will be made to answer the far more
difficult question of its ultimate significance. This development may simply
reflect the fact that the issue of school finance reform has become increasingly complex and less "judicially manageable." On the other hand, the
increase in court decisions which merely require minimum rather than equal
levels of education may mark a general societal retreat from the objective of
equality of educational opportunity for all, signaling an end to the
egalitarianism of the sixties and a movement toward libertarianism.
I1.

FROM SERRANO TO RODRIGUEZ6 AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
8
In the late sixties, the school finance laws of Illinois 7 and Virginia

4. 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
5. 62 N.J. at 509, 303 A.2d at 292.

6. The issues raised by Serrano and Rodriguez have been written about extensively and
will not be reworked here. See, e.g., Symposium, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 293 (1974),
reprintedin FUTURE.DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM (B. Levin ed. 1974); Carrington,

Financingthe American Dream: Equality and School Taxes, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1973);
Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court'sResponsibilitiesand Opportunitiesin the Development
of Federal ConstitutionalLaw, 60 CAL. L. REV. 720 (1972).
7. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd sub nom. mem., McInnis v.

Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). In Illinois, as in every state except Hawaii, local school districts
had been delegated the authority by the state legislature to raise funds for education by levying

a property tax on property within the school district, although the legislature had enacted a
maximum tax rate which the districts could not exceed. The state guaranteed a minimum of
$400 per pupil. School districts which raised less than that at a predetermined tax rate (or
computational tax rate), because of their low property values, received sufficient funds from
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were challenged as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Neither suit was successful, because the courts, having
construed the plaintiffs' claims as seeking a system which provided resources on the basis of educational "need," felt there were no manageable
standards for a court to determine such "need." 9 Following these early
defeats, school finance reform lawyers developed a legal theory that seemed
easier for courts to grasp--one which would not involve the judiciary in the

complexities of affirmatively requiring that expenditures be made in a
certain manner or amount.10 This theory, first articulated in Serrano,
became known as the "fiscal neutrality" theory, since it focused on freeing
the tie between the level of expenditures and district property wealth.
Because of the early success of this litigative strategy, suits were filed
in nearly two-thirds of the states and between 1971 and 1973 nine decisions
were handed down. " Nearly all of these decisions followed the reasoning of
the state to make up the difference between what the district raised and the state-guaranteed
minimum. Those districts with high property values could raise substantially more than the $400
per pupil guaranteed by the state "foundation plan," at the same or even lower tax rate than
districts with low property values. 293 F. Supp. at 330. Since the fiscal capacity (per pupil
property values) of the individual districts varied substantially, per pupil expenditures also
varied-between $480 and $1,000. Id. Although the court conceded that the quality of education might vary similarly, that was a matter to be addressed by the state legislature rather than
the courts.
8. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44
(1970).
9. The plaintiffs in McInnis asserted that state statutes which permitted disparities in per
pupil expenditures violated their fourteenth amendment rights to equal protection and due
process, since students from districts with high property values received a good education while
those from other property districts, "who [had] equal or greater educational need" were
deprived of such an education. 293 F. Supp. at 329. The court conceded that there was a
presumption that "students receiving a $1000 education are better educated than those acquiring a $600 schooling," id. at 331, but declared that there were "no 'discoverable and manageable standards' by which a court [could] determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when
it is violated." Id. at 335. The plaintiffs had demanded that "expenditures be made only on the
basis of pupils' educational needs without regard to the financial strength of local school
districts." The alternative-'"equal dollars for each student"-was also dismissed by the court
as inappropriate. Id. at 336. In the Burruss case, the plaintiffs had urged that educational
resources should be related to varying levels of "educational needs." 310 F. Supp. at 573. The
court, relying on Mclnnis, rejected the plaintiffs' claim and suggested that they seek legislative
relief. The court noted that it had "neither the knowledge, nor the means, nor the power to
tailor the public moneys to fit the varying needs of these students throughout the state." Id. at
574.
10. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 2
(1970).
11. See Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Rodriguez v. San Antonio
Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Van Dusartz
v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Hollins v. Shofstall, Civ. No. C-253652 (Ariz.
Super. Ct., June 1, 1972), rev'd, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Caldwell v. Kansas, Civ. No.
50616 (Johnson County Dist. Ct., Kan., Aug. 30, 1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203
N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 118
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Serrano and relied on the fourteenth amendment. This period of intense
judicial activity was brought up short, however, by the Supreme Court

decision in Rodriguez. In that case, the majority of the Court found that
Texas' system of financing schools did not discriminate against any class of
persons considered "suspect" since the case dealt with property-poor
school districts, not poor persons. 2 The Court distinguished earlier cases in
which wealth classifications had been declared invalid on the ground that

they had involved discrimination on the basis of personal wealth.13 Secondly, the Court pointed out that the wealth discrimination complained of in
Rodriguez did not cause an absolute deprivation but merely produced a
relative difference in the quality of education.14
The majority further held that education is not a fundamental right,
since it is neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. 15
With neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right involved, there
was no basis on which to invoke the strict scrutiny test of the equal
protection clause. 16 The Court therefore turned to the rational basis standard
of equal protection and found that the Texas system of school financing
rationally furthered a legitimate state purpose: to encourage "a large meas-

ure of participation in the control of each district's schools at the local
7
level." 1

III.

FISCAL

NEUTRALITY AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS

After Rodriguez, reform-minded advocates began to turn to the state
courts. Robinson, which had struck down the New Jersey school finance
N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972), supplemented in 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972),
aff'd as modified, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973); Spano v. Board of Educ. of Lakeland Cent.
School Dist. No. 1, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Sweetwater County
Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo. 1971), juris.relinquished,493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo.

1972).
12. 411 U.S. at 28. The Court suggested that there were three ways of looking at the class
discriminated against: (1) children from families whose incomes are below some designated
poverty line; (2) children from families whose incomes are low relative to others; (3) children
who, regardless of their family's income, reside in low property wealth districts. Id. at 19-20.
The Court's analysis of its earlier wealth discrimination cases indicated that they had concerned
only those who "were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence
• . . sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit." Id.
The Court found that there was no showing that the Texas school finance system "operates to
the peculiar disadvantage of any class fairly definable as indigent, or as composed of persons
whose incomes are beneath any designated poverty level." Id. at 22-23. The Court also found
no evidence that the "poorest people" were "concentrated" in the poorest districts. Id.
13. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956).
14. 411 U.S. at 23.
15. Id. at 35.
16. Id. at 40.
17. Id. at 49.
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law as in violation of the state constitution, provided some optimism despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez. In turning to the state courts,
some plaintiffs challenged their state's school finance system on the ground
that it violated the state constitutional provision which guarantees a free
public education to children residing in the state. 18 Other plaintiffs turned to
their state's equivalent of the equal protection clause as the basis for
declaring their school finance laws unconstitutional.
A.

State Education Clause Litigation.

In Robinson, the New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the state's
school finance scheme on the ground that it violated the state's constitutional command to the legislature to provide a "thorough and efficient system of
free public schools." 19 In construing this constitutional provision, the court
stated that "the Constitution's guarantee must be understood to embrace that
educational opportunity which is needed in the contemporary setting to
equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor
market.'20 The court then held that there was no relationship between the
18. Almost all state constitutions contain an express provision guaranteeing a free public
education, although the language varies from state to state. Eight states mandate a "thorough
and efficient" system of free public schools. MD. CONsT. art. VIII, § I; MINN. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 3; N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 4, 1; OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; S.D.
CONST. art. VIII, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 9; see OFFICE OF
EDUCATION, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STATE COSISTITUTIONAL PROVI-

SIONS AND SELECTED LEGAL MATERIALS RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (DHEW Pub.

No. (OE) 73-00002, 1973).
Another seven states use either "thorough" or "efficient." ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § I
(efficient); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (thorough); DEL. CONST. art. X, § I (efficient); IDAHO
CONST. art. IX, § 1 (thorough); ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (efficient); Ky. CONST. § 183 (efficient);
TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (efficient); see OFFICE OF EDUCATION, supra at 6.
Eight states mandate a "general and uniform" public school system. ARIZ. CONST. art. XI,
§ 1; IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1; IND. CONST. art. VIII, § I; MINN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.C.
CONST. art. IX, § 2(l); OR. CONST. art. VII, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art.
IX, § 2; see OFFICE OF EDUCATION, supra at 6.
Ten states guarantee either a "general" ora "uniform" system. ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1
(general); COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (uniform); DEL. CONST. art. X, § 1 (general); FLA. CONST.
art. IX, § 1 (uniform); KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (uniform); NEV. CONST. art. XI, § 2 (uniform);
N.M. CONST. art. XII, § I (uniform); N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 148 (uniform); UTAH CONST. art.
X, § I (uniform); WVyo. CONST. art. VII, § I (uniform); see OFFICE OF EDUCATION, supra at 6.
Many states use more than one of these descriptive phrases. See, e.g., Idaho: "[I]t shall be
the duty of the legislature of Idaho to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough
system of public, free common schools," IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (emphasis added).
The remaining states have education clauses more limited in nature, such as those which
mandate the provision of a "system of common schools" or "a public educational system."
See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. IX, 2d § 7; LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 1; N.Y.
CONST. art. XI, § 1.
19. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, 1.
20. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. Subsequently, the legislature enacted the Public School
Education Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1 to -33 (West Supp. 1977), which defined a
"thorough and efficient system of free public schools" as one which "providels] to all children
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educational needs of school districts and their tax bases. 2 It concluded that
because New Jersey's system of financing education relied heavily on local
revenue, resulting in substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures, the
22
system failed to fulfill the mandate of the constituti6n.
In Seattle School DistrictNo. 1 v. Washington,23 a state trial court in
Washington also found that state's system of financing education in violation of the state's constitutionally mandated duty to make "ample provision
in New Jersey, regardless of socioeconomic status or geographic location, the educational
opportunity which will prepare them to function politically, economically and socially in a
democratic society." Id. § 18A:7A-4. The legislative definition is substantially similar to the
standard suggested by the state supreme court in Robinson I, and was affirmed by that court on
the assumption that the legislature would provide sufficient funding to support such an education. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 464, 355 A.2d 129, 136 (1976) (Robinson V). When the
New Jersey legislature failed to fund the 1975 Act, the court enjoined the expenditure of any
funds for the support of public schools until the act was fully funded for the school year 197677. Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 160, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (1976) (Robinson VI).
21. In view of the state system's heavy reliance on the local property tax, and the wide
disparities in assessed valuation of taxable property per pupil, the result of the state financing
scheme was substantial inter-district inequalities in per pupil expenditures. From this, the court
concluded that
[t]he constitutional mandate could not be said to be satisfied unless we were to
suppose the unlikely proposition that the lowest level of dollar performance happens
to coincide with the constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level
are attributable to local decisions to do more than the State was obliged to do.
62 N.J. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295.
22. In a recent Connecticut case, the court held, as an alternative ground of decision, that
the legislature's constitutional requirement to enact "appropriate" legislation to provide free
public education was not met by the school financing statute. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615,
376 A.2d 359 (1977). In that case, the court found that the heavy reliance on the local property
tax to support education (70 percent of the educational dollar is raised locally, 20 to 25 percent
comes from the state, and 5 percent from the federal government), because of the wide
disparities in taxable property per pupil among the school districts in the state of Connecticut,
results in the property-rich towns having much higher per pupil expenditures at lower tax rates
than the property-poor districts can afford even at much higher tax rates. In contrast to most
states, Connecticut does not even have a "foundation plan" which offsets to a limited extent
differences in property values. State aid in Connecticut is distributed on the basis of a flat grant
per pupil regardless of differences among districts in property wealth. Thus the court held that
school finance legislation which relies
primarily on a local property tax base without regard to the disparity in the financial
ability of the towns to finance an educational program and with no significant equalizing state support, is not "appropriate legislation" (article eight, § 1) to implement the
requirement that the state provide a substantially equal educational opportunity to its
youth in its free public elementary and secondary schools.
Id. at 649, 376 A.2d at 374-75.
23. Civ. No. 53950 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash., Jan. 14, 1977). The factual
situation in Seattle School District indicated that in order to meet statutory and regulatory
standards for education, the Seattle School District had to resort to annual referendums,
"special excess levies," to provide approximately one-third of its funds. By failing to provide
the school district with adequate funds to meet the educational requirements, the State compelled the school district to rely on the voters within the district to make up the difference; but
the voters exhibited an "increasing tendency" to avoid the additional tax burden. Id., slip op.
at 4. See note 59 infra.
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for the education of all children residing within its borders." 2 4 Here the
court was less concerned with relative differences in per pupil expenditures

among school districts than with the question of whether the state fulfilled
its constitutional duty to provide students in Seattle with "a basic program
of education" 25 without the district's having to resort to voter-approved
"special excess levies. "26 The case has been appealed to the state supreme
court.
B.

State Equal Protection Clause Litigation.

Since Rodriguez had eliminated the federal equal protection clause as
a basis for holding California's financing system unconstitutional, the trial
court, on remand of Serrano, held that education was a fundamental right
under the state constitution, requiring the state to show a compelling interest
in order to permit this right to be conditioned on district wealth.27 The
inability of the state to meet this burden resulted in the school finance
system being declared in violation of the California Constitution's equal
protection clause. This holding was affirmed by the California Supreme
Court in Serrano /.2 8 The state supreme court rejected the argument that
"the Rodriguez approach to assessing 'fundamentalness' in affected rights
24. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
25. Seattle School District, slip op. at 28.
26. Id., slip op. at 24-25. Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A7662725 (Hamilton
County C.P. Ct., Ohio, Nov. 28, 1977), raises a similar issue-whether the state can delegate its
duty to provide education to local voter choice. The city of Cincinnati, like the city of Seattle,
has been unable to pass a tax referendum. The trial court held that the General Assembly of the
State of Ohio has a constitutional duty to provide such additional funds as are necessary when a
school district is unable to raise sufficient revenue from property tax levies to finance a
"thorough and efficient" school system. Id., slip op. at 358.
27. Serrano v. Priest, No. 938,254 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.,JCal., Apr. 10, 1974),
aff'd, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
28. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977). The state
supreme court pointed out that although California's equal protection provisions are "substantially the equivalent of" the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution they "are possessed of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may
demand an analysis different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were
applicable." Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Then, quoting from People
v. Longhill, 14 Cal. 3d 943, 951 n.4, 538 P.2d 753,758 n.4, 123 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302 n.4 (1975), the
court said:
[D]ecisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are
persuasive authority to be afforded respectful consideration, but are to be followed by
California courts only when they provide no less individual protection than is guaranteed by California law.
18 Cal. 3d at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366. The court also pointed out that while
considerations of federalism may have been one basis for the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodiguez,
[t]he constraints of federalism, so necessary to the proper functioning of our unique
system of national government are not applicable to this court in its determination of
whether our own state's public school financing system runs afoul of state constitutional provisions.
rd. at 766-67, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
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[explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the federal Constitution] is applied by

analogy to the state sphere."29 In the view of the California Supreme Court,
"those individual rights and liberties which lie at the core of our free and
representative form of government, are properly considered 'fundamental,"
and education clearly fit into this category.
The Connecticut Supreme Court also held that its state's equal protection clause was violated by the existing school financing scheme in Horton
v. Meskill. It determined that education is a fundamental right guaranteed
'3

by the Connecticut Constitution within the meanings of both the test adopted
by the United States Supreme Court in Rodriguez (a right explicitly mentioned in the Constitution) and the test adopted by the California Supreme

Court in Serrano 1f (an individual right which lies at the core of our form of
government). 32 As in Serrano I, the court required "strict judicial
scrutiny" of the financing plan. Since the state's objective of local control
could be achieved by less onerous means, the plan's interference with the
fundamental right to education could not be justified.

An Ohio court has held in Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Wal-

ter33 that since the state constitution guarantees the right of school age
children to attend school in a "thorough and efficient system of common
schools," the discriminations among school children created by the state
system of financing education impair a fundamental interest. Evaluated
under either the strict scrutiny test or the more deferential test of equal
protection, the system could not stand since the court concluded that neither
a compelling state interest nor a rational basis could be found which would
support the existing discrimination against school children. 34
29. 18 Cal. 3d at 766-67, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
Suffice it to say that we are constrained no more by inclination than by authority to
gauge the importance of rights and interests affected by the legislative classifications
wholly through determining the extent to which they are "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed" . . . by the ternis of our compendious, comprehensive, and distinctly
mutable state Constitution.
Id.

30. I'd. at 767-68, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
31. 172 Conn. 615, 642-46, 376 A.2d 359, 372-73 (1977). See note 22 supra.
32. Id. at 643.46, 376 A.2d at 372-73.
33. No. A7662725 (Hamilton County C.P. Ct., Ohio, Nov. 28, 1977).
34. Id., slip op. at 375-81.
In denying the Colorado State Board of Education's motion to dismiss an action challenging the constitutionality of that state's school finance system, a Colorado district court held that
education was an explicitly guaranteed fundamental right, since the constitution mandatedand has since 1876-that the legislature establish and maintain a "thorough and uniform system
of free public schools." Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. C-73688, slip op. at 2022 (Denver County Dist. Ct., Colo., Dec. 12, 1977). However, the court went on to note that
there is such a close relationship in Colorado "between public education and other rights
traditionally recognized as basic and essential to citizenship"--for example, the right to vote
and to effectively participate in the political process-that education would be a fundamental
right implicitly guaranteed by the Colorado constitution if it were not expressly provided for in
the constitution. Id., slip op. at 22-27.
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The conclusion drawn from a review of the litigation under state
education and equal protection clauses is that despite the Robinson victory,
school finance reform litigation has moved slowly and fitfully with almost
as many steps backwards as forwards. Since 1973, only three successful
attacks on inequitable school finance systems have relied upon the education
clauses of their state constitutions. 35 In addition to Serrano, which on
remand reaffirmed that California's school finance scheme was in violation
of the equal protection clause of the California Constitution, two states have
used their state's equal protection clause only as an alternate ground for
decision. 36 Thus, only five states, including New Jersey, are now under
court order to revise their systems of financing education and appeals are
still pending in two of these decisions. By contrast, the state supreme courts
of three states have found that despite substantial disparities among districts
in per pupil expenditures, their state school financing schemes violated
neither the education clause nor the equal protection clause of their constitu37
tions.
C.

Varying Definitions of Equal Educational Opportunity.
In the post-Serrano, pre-Rodriguez period, equal educational opportunity was defined by the school finance cases as the equalization of fiscal
capacity (property tax base)38 or, even more simply, the equalization of per
pupil expenditures. 39 A review of the more recent school finance decisions,
however, reveals great variation as to what constitutes equal educational
opportunity. These differences are not unexpected considering that neither
the constitutional provisions on which the challenges to the school finance
laws are based nor their prior history of judicial interpretation is identical in
every state. Some courts have defined equal educational opportunity in
terms of equalizing inputs-that is, dollars or the educational resources
those dollars purchase-while other courts have focused on equalizing pupil
achievement, an output standard. Still other courts have moved toward
establishing minimum, rather than equal, levels of education (whether
measured by inputs or outputs).
35. Horton; Cincinnati;Seattle School District.
A Colorado state trial court, in Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. C-73688
(Denver County Dist. Ct., Colo., Dec. 12, 1977), has recently declared, in denying a motion to
dismiss a challenge to that state's system of financing education, that plaintiffs had stated a
claim for relief under that provision of the Colorado constitution which provides for the
establishment and maintenance of a "thorough and uniform system of public schools throughout the state." COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2. See note 34 supra.

36. Horton; Cincinnati.
37. Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975); Olsen v. Oregon, 276 Or. 9,
554 P.2d 139 (1976); Northshore v. Kinnear, 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
38. See, e.g., Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 598-99, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610.
39. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280,284 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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A review of the differences in the definition of equal educational
opportunity suggests the problem courts are having in applying the fiscal
neutrality theory. The simplistic approach allowed for an easily understood
and readily grasped standard for measuring the constitutional inadequacies
of state school finance laws, but ignored the complexities and variations of
state conditions.
1. Equal Inputs. The New Jersey and California courts arrived at
differing definitions of the equal educational opportunity which the legislature is required to provide under their respective state constitutions. For the
California trial court in Serrano, expenditure differences reflect the degree
of opportunity provided by the educational system. Its standard is based on
inputs: the state must "provide for a uniformity and equality of treatment to
all the pupils of the State," meaning that "the state may not . . . permit
. . . significant disparities in expenditures between school districts
....
-40 The court said that the disparities must be reduced to "amounts
considerably less than $100 per pupil.''41 No relationship between inputs
and outcomes must be shown. The Serrano trial court thus indicated that the
level-the "adequacy"--of the educational offering is constitutionally irrelevant; it is the "quality" of'the educational program relative to other
42
districts that is the issue.
On appeal, the California Supreme Court also focused on expenditure
disparities, and adopted the "school-district offerings" standard rather than
the "pupil achievement" standard to measure the "quality" of education
existing in each school district.4 3 Thus, where there are wide disparities in
expenditure levels among school districts, there will be wide disparities in
the quality of educational programs and opportunities among those districts.
This does not mean that absolutely equal dollar inputs will be required,
however. "Although an equal expenditure level per pupil in every district is
not educationally sound or desirable because of differing educational needs,
equality of educational opportunity requires that all school districts possess
an equal ability in terms of revenue to provide students with substantially
equal opportunities for learning."4
The problem with an inputs standard-as many have noted 4 5 -is that
there is little undisputed empirical evidence as to the relationship between
40. Serrano v. Priest, Civ. No. 938,254, slip op. at 51 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct.,
Cal., Apr. 10, 1974), aff'd, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
41. Civ. No. 938,254, slip op. at 102.

42. Id., slip op. at 59.
43. Serrano 11, 18 Cal. 3d at 747-48, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 8, 24, 27, 37-38 (1974); U.S. OFICE OF EDUCATION,
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
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input disparities and educational consequences. Moreover, an equality of
inputs standard is too rigid a standard. The cost of providing educational
services differs among school districts within a state. In particular, urban
areas have to pay more for teachers of equivalent education and experience,
for site acquisitions and school construction, and for security than do rural
areas. Similarly, some districts have a higher concentration of children with
special educational needs which may require more and different kinds of
resources. The application of an equal inputs standard which fails to recognize these variations may actually result in unequal inputs.
The California Supreme Court, in Serrano II, did suggest an alternative to California's present unconstitutional school finance scheme that 4is6
not strictly an equal inputs standard-school district power equalization.
Under a district power equalization formula, a district may spend at a chosen
level per pupil, regardless of its property wealth, by levying the school tax
rate pegged by state statute to that chosen level of expenditure. Per pupil
spending levels are "wealth-free" since the level of spending is unrelated to
the actual revenue generated in a particular district when the chosen tax rate
is applied to the district's property base. Since district power equalization is
a state aid program that equalizes the ability of each school district to taise
dollars for education, but leaves to local district choice the level of tax
effort, expenditure disparities could remain quite large. Thus the opinion
sets forth two seemingly conflicting standards-one requiring the narrowing
of per pupil expenditure differences among districts and the other permitting
expenditure disparities-no matter how large-as long as they are not a
function of district wealth. This "taxpayer equity" standard is discussed in
more detail below.
2. Equal Outputs. At first blush, the Robinson case appears to
define equal educational opportunity as the attainment of equal pupil
achievement levels. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in holding that the
state legislature is constitutionally compelled to provide a "thorough and
efficient" education, stated that the "thorough and efficient" education
guaranteed by the state constitution is "that educational opportunity which
is needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen
and as a competitor in the labor market." 4 7
312 (OE-38001, 1966) (the Coleman Report); Hanushek & Kain, On the Value of Equality of
Education Opportunity as a Guide to PublicPolicy, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F. Mosteller & D.,Moynihan eds. 1972); McDermott & Klein, The Cost-QualityDebate
in School FinanceLitigation:Do DollarsMake a Difference?, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 415,
419-20 (1974), reprinted in FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 117, 121-22 (B.
Levin ed. 1974). See also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43.
46. 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
47. 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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The difficulty with the outputs standard as a constitutionalrequirement
is that empirical research is not yet able to tell us what levels or kinds of
inputs are necessary to produce a certain output-particularly when children
come to the learning process with very different backgrounds and characteristics. To produce a given level of pupil achievement, for example, students
of low socioeconomic status, students with limited English-language ability,
and mentally retarded pupils may not only need more resources than the
average pupil but may also need different kinds of resources. It is not clear
whether the Robinson standard can be read to mean that differential educational resources would be required to the extent they are essential to the
requisite educational outcome.4 8 If Robinson is really suggesting that a
"needs" differential is constitutionally required, then the case seems to
have come full circle to the standard of educational opportunity sought (but
not obtained) by plaintiffs in Mclnnis v. Shapiro4 9-- that "expenditures be
made only on the basis of pupils' educationalneeds without regard to the
financial strength of local school districts.'"0 This approach was rejected in
Mclnnis because it provided "no 'discoverable and manageable standards'
by which a court [could] determine when the Constitution is satisfied and
' 51
when it is violated.
3. Minimal Adequacy. When analyzed more closely, however, the
Robinson standard is really one of minimum pupil achievement levels. The
New Jersey Supreme Court said that a "thorough and efficient" education
need not be equal across the state: "we do not say that if the State assumes
the cost of providing the constitutionally mandated education, it may not
authorize local government to go further ... "52 This constitutional
requirement that the state provide a minimally adequate education to all
districts is not unlike the standard suggested by the United States Supreme
Court in its dicta in Rodriguez, when it noted that the plaintiffs could not
succeed because they were unable to show that the Texas school finance
system "fail[ed] to provide each child with an opportunity to acquire the
48. Id.
The New Jersey State Legislature has responded by defining a "thorough and efficient
education" in terms of outputs- for example, the instruction necessary to bring about a certain
level of proficiency in basic reading and arithmetic skills. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-5 (West
Supp. 1977). Moreover, the students identified as in need-those who fail to demonstrate the
minimum skills proficiencies when tested-are to be provided with remedial help. Id. § 18A:7A14.

49. 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. II. 1968), aff'd sub nom. mem., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969). See note 9 supra.
50. 293 F. Supp. at 336 (emphasis added).

51. Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
52. Robinson, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295.
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of the rights of speech and
basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment
53
of full participation in the political process."
Seattle School District also suggests a mandated minimum or basic
level of education standard, although the language focuses solely on inputs
rather than pupil outcomes. In that case, the trial court indicated that it was
not at all concerned with expenditure disparities. The state's "paramount
duty," under its mandate to make "ample provision for the education of all
children residing within its borders," 54 was to guarantee sufficient funds to
support a "basic education" 55 without relying on excess local levies. Excess
levies
may only be required or utilized to fund programs, activities and
support services of the district which the state is not requiredto fund.
In other words, if the taxpayers in a district desire to offer an "enby the
riched" program, that is, one which goes beyond that required
56
constitution, then they may be required to fund the same.
Thus, once the state fulfills its duty of supplying every district with a basic
education, expenditure disparities resulting from local choice constitutional57
ly may exist, even if they are a direct consequence of district wealth.
An Ohio court adopted a similar stance. The fact that a large number of
school districts in Ohio were unable, because of inadequate resources, to
meet the minimum standards set by the State Board of Education (in the
areas of pupil-teacher ratios, textbooks and the like) was evidence that the
General Assembly had not met its constitutional duty to maintain a "thorough and efficient system of common schools." However, the Ohio trial
court indicated that once the state provided "a general education of high
quality" to all school districts, variations in local tax effort among the
districts may permissibly result in differences in educational offerings above
that level. 58 In contrast to Seattle School District, however, differences in
expenditure levels above the base level may not be wealth-related.
53. 411 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added). Several recent suits, relying on an "educational

malpractice" theory, have contended that there is a right to a minimum level of education. See,
e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854

(1976).
54. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
55. See Seattle School District, slip op. at 36-51.
56. Id., slip op. at 24 (emphasis in original).
57. The Washington state legislature has recently adopted a definition of "basic education"
in an attempt to comply with the court's order. The act, known as the Basic Education Act of
1977, requires the state to provide "fully sufficient" funding for the programs and services
specified in the act. 1977 Wash. Laws, ch. 359. Foreign languages are excluded from the
definition of basic education, but (along with traffic safety) are left to district discretionmeaning local funds. For a more detailed description of the act, see notes 82-87 infra and
accompanying text. The act clearly defines basic education in terms of inputs rather than
outputs, in contrast to the New Jersey act. See note 48 supra.
58. Cincinnati, slip op. at 390.
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Some of the unsuccessful challenges to school finance systems which
produced substantial disparities among districts in per pupil expenditures
resulted in decisions which seemed to advocate a similar theory. In Northshore v. Kinnear,59 the Washington Supreme Court held that the constitutional mandate to establish a "general and uniform system of public
schools'"'6 meant merely that the system should be
one in which every child in the state has free access to certain minimum
and reasonably standardized educational and instructional facilities and
opportunities to at least the 12th grade-a system administered with
that degree of uniformity which enables a child to transfer from one
district to another within the same grade. . and with access by each
student. . . to acquire those skills. . . that are reasonably understood
6
to be fundamental and basic to a sound education. '
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court, in rejecting a challenge to that
state's system of financing schools, declared that "uniform" as used in its
constitution could not be interpreted to mean that "the amounts available for
providing educational opportunities in every district must approach equality." 62 The constitutional provision is satisfied if the state "provides for a
minimum of educational opportunities in the district and permits the districts
to exercise local control over what they desire, and can furnish, over the
minimum. "63

Under this approach equal educational opportunity becomes whatever
the state determines are basic inputs- which could mean no kindergarten
programs, no art or music programs, no science or language programs, or
even no secondary school programs. Above and beyond a basic or minimum
program, the level of a child's education will be determined by district
wealth and effort. The California court's approach is quite different from
this "minimal adequacy" test. Even after the state had provided a basic or
adequate educational program in all districts, the California Supreme Court
would allow school districts to opt for an "enriched" program from local
revenues only if the revenue base were "power equalized. "64 If tax capacity
is not equalized, then spending differences among districts of more than
$100 per pupil are not constitutionally permissible even if the state were to
59. 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974). This case and the issues it raises are treated at

length in Andersen, Northshore School District v. Kinnear: The "General and Uniform" and
"Ample Provision" Clauses, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 366 (1974), reprinted in FUTURE
DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 68 (B. Levin ed. 1974); Andersen, School Financein
Washington-The Northshore Litigation and Beyond, 50 WASH. L. REV. 853 (1975).
60. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
61. 84 Wash. 2d at 729, 530 P.2d at 202. See also the discussion of California's education
clause in Serrano, 5 Cal. 3d at 595-96, 487 P.2d at 1248-49, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 608-09.
62. Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976).
63. Id. at 27, 554 P.2d at 148 (emphasis added).
64. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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fully fund a program of "basic education." On the other hand, the California court's approach, relying as it does on the equal protection rather than
the education clause, seems not to require the state to provide any particular
amount of education--even one that rises to the level of "minimally adequate' '-as long as what is provided is not wealth-related.
4. Taxpayer Equity. Yet another definition of equal educational
opportunity-which is neither an input nor an output standard-was suggested by the California courts. The California Supreme Court's fiscal
neutrality principle, as articulated in Serrano, implies that the state is
constitutionally required to equalize tax burdens in addition to (or instead of)
focusing on the equalization of expenditures. "Taxpayer equity" is defined
as freeing the tie between "capacity"-the district's per pupil property
values, and "effort"-the district's tax rate. On rerhand, the trial court
stated that to be constitutional, the state's school financing system must
provide for uniformity and equality of treatment to all pupils and that
[u]niformity and equality of treatment of pupils also mean that parenttaxpayers of children in some school districts may not be required to
pay significantly higher tax rates than parent-taxpayers in other school
districts in order for the former's children to receive the same or a
65
lower quality of education than that received by the latter's children.
And in Serrano H, as noted earlier, the state supreme court suggests
that one acceptable method of financing education "which would not
produce wealth-related spending disparities" is school district power
equalizing, which permits districts to choose different per pupil spending
levels, "but for each level of expenditure chosen the tax effort would be the
same for each school district choosing such level whether it be a high-wealth
or a low-wealth district.' '66 Clearly this standard of equal educational
opportunity is concerned more with insuring taxpayer equity and district
"choice" rather than equalizing either educational inputs or outcomes for
all children in the state. Although under such a system, a district's expenditure level will be determined only by its taxing effort and not also by its
property wealth, the level of expenditures for a child's education is still
dependent upon where he lives-the difference being that disparities in
expenditures are related to the preferences of local voters rather than district
wealth.67 By contrast, the New Jersey court, in Robinson, expressly rejected the concept that there was any constitutionally required "equality"
65. Serrano v. Priest, Civ. No. 938,254, slip op. at52 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Cal.,
Apr. 10, 1974), aff'd, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
66. Serrano 11, 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355. See text
accompanying note 46 supra.
67. See, e.g., Levin, Alternatives to the PresentSystem of School Finance:Their Problems
and Prospects, 61 GEO. L.J. 879, 920-21 (1973).
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where taxpayers of different school districts were concerned. 68 Similarly,
the Ohio district court in Cincinnati has emphatically rejected that requirement. Equalizing the taxing capacity of school districts rather than equalizing the educational opportunities of school children was found to be
constitutionally unacceptable. "In the matter of education, the obligation of
the General Assembly extends to the school children, not to the taxpayers.
Education, not tax equity, is guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution.' '69
Thus the school finance cases have produced varied definitions of equal
educational opportunity, none of which are free of problems. They are either
easily attainable (theoretically, not politically) but ignore the complexities
of the real world system; or are not capable of being implemented on the
basis of present-day knowledge; or have abandoned any concern for equality
for a theory of minimum adequacy; or have little to do with education and
children.
D.

The Trend to "Special Interest" Cases.

In part because of the inability of the fiscal neutrality theory to deal
with some of the special problems which exist in certain types of school
districts, there has been a movement toward litigating these special interests
directly. Thus, although litigation efforts are continuing under state equal
protection or education clauses, 70 more recent litigation is seeking to insure
that "special needs" or "interests" are properly protected in a state's
school finance system. The initial legislative reforms that were proposed in
the wake of Serrano and its progeny failed to take into account the financing
problems of certain types of school districts-primarily large urban districts.
The "fiscal neutrality" or wealth-free standard, devised in response to a
system in which low property values correlated with low per pupil expenditures, failed to recognize the peculiar fiscal problems of central city schools.
These problems stem not from low property values but from higher costs for
68. 62 N.J. at 502-03, 303 A.2d at 288.
69. Cincinnati, slip op. at 380.
70. See, e.g., Alma School Dist. No. 30 v. DuPree, No. 77-406 (Pulaski County Chancery
Ct., Ark., filed Jan. 28, 1977) ("general" and "efficient" and the federal equal protection
clause); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., C.A. No. C-73688 (Denver County Dist.

Ct., Colo., Dec. 12, 1977, denial of motion to dismiss) ("thorough and uniform" and federal and
state equal protection clauses); Thomas v. Stewart, No. 8275 (Polk County Super. Ct., Ga.,
filed Dec. 19, 1974) (state uniform taxation clause and state equal protection and education
clauses); Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, No. 8208/74 (Nassau County Sup. Ct., N.Y.
filed 1974) (state equal protection and education clauses); Pauley v. Kelly, No. 75-1268 (Kanaw-

ha County Super. Ct., W. Va., June 14, 1977) ("thorough and efficient" and state equal
protection clauses) (defendants' motion to dismiss granted; plaintiffs have apealed to the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals). All of these cases are described in Lawyers' Comm.
for Civil Rights Under Law, Update On State-Wide School Finance Cases (Feb. 1978).
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both education and other public services.7 1 The result, therefore, has been
an attempt to have such problems considered by courts as part of any case
challenging the constitutionality of a state's school financing system.
One suit which has raised a number of the problems faced by urban
school districts is Boardof Education, Levittown v. Nyquist.7 2 The case was
initially brought by a low-wealth suburban school district as a Serrano-type
case. However, in an attempt to draw the court's attention to their particular
problems, the four largest cities in New York state7 3 have intervened. The
problems which these cities face are typical of those of many cities so that an
examination of the issues presented is appropriate. The Levittown intervenors have argued that the "equalization" provisions of the state school
finance scheme bear no "fair and substantial relation" to the objective of
equalization of the capacity of school districts to finance education, since
the provisions regard per pupil property wealth as the only measure of
school fiscal capacity.
1. Cost Differentials. The first contention of the intervenors is that
urban districts, because of higher prices or wage rates, have to spend more
per pupil than rural or suburban school districts to provide a comparable
educational program. 74 This price-wage differential reflects area "labor
market" differences and the fact that cities generally have a higher proportion of professional staff with advanced degrees and years of experience.
Site acquisition costs and the costs per square foot of constructing school
facilities are also substantially higher in cities than in suburban and rural
areas, as are the costs of plant maintenance and security. 75
This issue was also confronted in Seattle School District. The court
there refused to reach the issue of whether an "urban factor" must be
included in any school finance formula, suggesting that it was an argument
that should be made to the legislature and not the court. 76 However, the
court implicitly accepted a "cost differentials" principle which would take
into account the wage-price differences central cities often have to pay to
provide the same educational offering which the typical student receives in a
suburban or rural school district. The Washington state trial court suggested
that, in the absence of a legislative definition, the "basic education" which
the state constitutionally is required to provide could be determined by one
71. See generally B. LEVIN, T. MULLER & C. SANDOVAL, THE HIGH COST OF EDUCATION IN
CITIES (1973).
72. No. 8208/74 (Nassau County Sup. Ct., N.Y., filed 1974).
73. The four cities involved are New York, Rochester, Buffalo and Syracuse.
74. Post-trial Review of the Evidence for Plaintiffs-Intervenors, Board-of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, No. 8208/74, at 50-59 (Nassau County Sup. Ct., N.Y., filed 1974).
75. See B. LEVIN, et al.,isuprainote 71.
76. Seattle School District, slip op. at 52 n. 16A.
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of three possible methods, each of which had to take into account what to

the court were the most significant factors in terms of quantitative inputs:

77
staffing ratios and salaries.
The first method, the "collective wisdom" approach, involved
"costing out" for Seattle "the statewide average per pupil deployment of
certified and classified staff and nonsalary related costs for the maintenance

78
and operation of the common school program for a normal range student"

(a ratio of 20:1 pupils to certified employees). An alternative method was to
"cost out" for Seattle what is presently required by state statutes and rules
and regulations of the State Board of Education. 79 The court found that
under this approach, the basic education requirements for Seattle for 197576 would have cost $58.6 million. However, under the state foundation

level guarantee of $480 per weighted pupil, Seattle had available to it only
$47.3 million, and would have to rely on locally-voted levies to raise the
difference. 80 The third method, somewhat similar to the second, was to

"cost out" for Seattle the state's accreditation standards, 8 1 which included a

25:1 pupil-teacher ratio. Under each of these approaches, it would cost
considerably less per pupil to provide the same quantum of education in
rural school districts than it would in large urban school districts because of

the wage-price differentials. A school finance formula which included
adjustments for such staff characteristics as years of experience, advanced
degrees and higher salaries for equivalent education and experience levels

would provide more money per pupil to urban areas for the same level of
educational services than rural and suburban areas.

The Washington state legislature has recently adopted a definition of
"basic education" in an attempt to comply with the court decision.8 2 The
77- Id., slip op. at 48.
78. Id., slip op. at 53.
79. Id., slip op. at 54-55. Among the kinds of things that are included in the state requirements that are "costed out" are the requirement that students have no less than 180 days of
instruction per school year; that grades 1-6 are to provide instruction in the skills of literacy and
computation in accordance with a curriculum which includes spelling, reading, composition and
literature, penmanship, arithmetic and the like; and that grades 7-12 are to provide instruction in
history, geography, civics, economics, foreign language, physical education and so on. The
ratio of students to certificated personnel is not to exceed 30:1 and there must be adequate
provision for the health, safety and housing of students. Id., slip op. at 55-56. Elements that are
excluded include pre-school and kindergarten programs, transportation and adult education.
Id., slip op. at 56.
80. Id., slip op. at 59.
81. In "costing out" the accreditation standards, the basic educational requirements for
1975-76 amount to $572.8 million, excluding kindergarten. Id., slip op. at 69. Again, the court
noted that this is considerably more than the amount that Seattle had for the 1975-76 school
year. Id., slip op. at 70.
82. The Basic Education Act, 1977 Wash. Laws ch. 359.
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act, after setting out general goals and objectives, 83 prescribes the proportions of "basic skills" 84 and "work skills" 85 of the curriculum that each
district must offer, and the minimum number of hours of instruction for each
area. The act further specifies that the state must provide "fully sufficient"
funding for the programs and services prescribed in the act. 86 Staffing ratios
are to be part of the distribution formula, 87 computed on the basis of the
district's actual average salary plus fringe benefits.
In the Cincinnati case, the Ohio trial court found that "the large urban,

inner city districts have unique and special problems and substantial extra
costs which the non-urban districts do not have."

88 The

court noted the high

expenditures incurred by the Cincinnati School District for the repair of
damage caused by vandalism, and for plant and student security. The court
also documented the staff and curriculum reductions and curtailments and
the high pupil-teacher ratios in the Cincinnati and other large city school
districts in Ohio, and the deteriorating condition of the physical facilities, in
part due to the cutbacks in custodial staff and the termination of preventive
maintenance programs. 8 9 Thus, clearly endorsing the principle of a cost

differentials factor, the court held that in order to comply with the state
83. The goal of the act is
to provide students with the opportunity to achieve those skills which are generally
recognized as requisite to learning. Those skills shall include the ability:
(1) To distinguish, interpret and make use of words, numbers and other symbols,
including sound, colors, shapes and textures;
(2) To organize words and other symbols into acceptable verbal and nonverbal forms
of expression, and numbers into their appropriate functions;
(3) To perform intellectual functions such as problem solving, decision making, goal
setting, selecting, planning, predicting, experimenting, ordering and evaluating;
and
(4) To use various muscles necessary for coordinating physical and mental functions.
Id. § 2.
84. "Basic skills" consist of "reading/language arts, mathematics, social studies, science,
music, art, health and physical education." Id. § 3(2)(a).
85. "Work skills" consist of "industrial arts, home and family life education, business and
office education, distributive education, agricultural education, health occupations education,
vocational education, trade and industrial education, technical education and career education." Id. § 3(l)(b).
86. "Basic education shall be considered to be fully funded by those amounts of dollars
appropriated by the legislature . . . to fund those program requirements identified [above]."
Id. § 4.
87. The distribution formula must
provide appropriate recognition of the following costs among the various districts
within the state:
(1) Certificated staff and their related costs;
(2) Classified staff and their related costs;
(3) Nonsalary costs; and
(4) Extraordinary costs of remote and necessary schools and small high schools.
Id. § 5. Additional urban costs may (not "must") be funded by the state legislature through
categorical programs. Id. § 7.
88. Cincinnati,slip op. at 117.
89. Id., slip op. at 95-110.
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constitution's "thorough and efficient" clause and equal protection clause,
any system for financing education in Ohio must include as one of its criteria
90
adequate compensation for the special costs of urban districts.
2. Municipal Overburden. The second contention of the Levittown
intervenors is that their districts are incapacitated by heavy "municipal
overburden.'"91 The term "municipal overburden" refers to the noneducational public services which central cities must support out of the property
tax, such as police and fire protection or health and welfare services. It is
argued that the comparatively high percentage of the property tax allocated
for those noneducation services acts as a constraint on the tax rate levied for
education. Most suburban and rural school districts are not so heavily
burdened by these noneducational expenses, permitting most of the property
tax revenues to be allocated to the schools. The concept of municipal
overburden has been the object of much discussion, and one significant
question is whether this concept should be recognized in the school finance
formula or whether it should be dealt with by other legislation and not
entangled with the issues of school finance reform.
The Serrano H court wrestled with the municipal overburden question
and decided that it was irrelevant. There, however, the issue was raised by
the defendants in opposing the "fiscal neutrality" principle sought by the
plaintiffs. 92 The court found that the incidence of "municipal overburden"
(as well as "cost differentials" and "pupil needs differentials") is not
limited to any particular level of per pupil property wealth. A system which
ties
a district's ability to respond to its educational needs and desires to its
taxable wealth per ADA [average daily attendance], clearly discriminates among equally beleaguered urban districts from the point of view
of their respective capacities to bring educational benefits to the stu93
dents resident within their borders.
The court further noted that under a fiscally neutral system, the ability of a
school district to meet its peculiar problems would not depend on its taxable
94
wealth.
90. Id., slip op. at 389.
91. Post-Trial Review of the Evidence for Plaintiffs-Intervenors, Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, supra note 74, at 12-41.
92. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 753-61, 557 P.2d at 943-47, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 359-63.
93. Id. at 758-59, 557 P.2d at 946, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The court illustrated this by

comparing the problems of the Los Angeles School District, which has relatively low per pupil
property values, with those of San Francisco where property values are quite high. Id. at 758
n.37, 557 P.2d at 946 n.37, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 362 n.37.

94. Id. at 758-59, 557 P.2d at 946, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 362.

Vol. 1977:1099] SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION

1119

By contrast, the Ohio trial court in Cincinnatifound as a fact that urban
school districts have a "disproportionate non-school governmental cost"
compared to suburban school districts, 95 and that this "municipal overburden" is so great that the property taxpayers of those districts "are unable to
withstand the financial strain of supporting educational costs to the extent
that educational interests require. '96
3. "Needs" Differentials. In addition to claiming that they are
burdened both by higher costs for equivalent educational services and by
higher costs for noneducational public services than other districts, the
Levittown city intervenors also contended that they have a higher proportion
than other types of districts of those students that require greater than
average educational resources-such as the handicapped, the educationally
97
disadvantaged, and the student with limited English-language skills.
If this last contention is to be a successful litigation strategy, it must
avoid the pitfalls encountered by the early school finance suits. In Mclnnis,
for example, it had been argued that expenditures must be on the basis of
pupils' educational needs without regard to the fiscal capacity of local
school districts. Even if this were required by the fourteenth amendment, the
court declared, there were no judicially manageable standards for determining when the constitution was satisfied and when it was violated. 98 The
Levittown intervenors have attempted to avoid this problem by showing that
the high concentration of urban poverty in the inner cities results in a high
proportion of children suffering from such "education overburdens" as
impaired learning readiness, impaired mental, emotional and physical
health, mental retardation and other learning disabilities, and English-language difficulties. The intervenors then showed that specific programs or
services have been successful in overcoming these problems, but that
because of inadequate resources these programs and services have had to be
curtailed. 99
95. Cincinnati, slip op. at 191.

96. Id., slip op. at 356. The court emphasized that this is evidence of the unfairness of the
system to school children but that no legal rights of taxpayers have been violated. Id.
97. Post-Trial Review of the Evidence for Plaintiffs-Intervenors, Board of Educ., Levit-

town v. Nyquist, supra note 74, at 70-153.
98. 293 F. Supp. at 335-36 (dictum).

99. By way of example, the intervenors point to the impact of Follow Through, an
experimental federal program of compensatory education, which provides services to children

in kindergarten through the third grade at an annual additional cost of $840 per pupil in New
York City. Evidence was introduced that those children in the program improved significantly.
Post-Trial Review of the Evidence for Plaintiffs-Intervenors, Board of Educ., Levittown v.
Nyquist, supra note 74, at 97. The intervenors concluded that this program shows that

although. . . compensating for impaired learning readiness is quite feasible, the effort
to do so for the enormous numbers of readiness-impaired children in the cities faces
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An educational "needs" differential has also been sought through
other education reform litigation. The underlying question is whether equality of educational opportunity requires school districts to provide "compensatory" education according to the needs of educationally disadvantaged

children. Although no court has specifically held that an educationally
disadvantaged child is constitutionally entitled to compensatory education,100 this issue is implicit in a number of cases involving both the

physically and mentally handicapped and the "linguistically handicapped."
Several of the cases concerning physically and mentally handicapped
students have sought education "appropriate to the needs" of such students,
but have reached conflicting conclusions. Some have held that there is no
constitutional right to a certain level of special education, l0' while others
have found that school authorities are required by the United States
Constitution to provide education appropriate to the learning capacities of
the handicapped students. 102
formidable obstacles. The common elements of effective programs are individualization, small classes, intensive support services, in-service training, and encouragement
of parental involvement. . . all of which require many additional and trained personnel and (sic] the cities cannot afford.
Id. 98. The intervenors give many similar examples of successful programs for dealing with
various "education overburdens" which have been discontinued for lack of funds. See id. 108,
110, 133, 134, 142-43. In the Cincinnati case, the court held that a constitutional system for
financing education must compensate urban districts for their special needs, including the costs
of vocational and special education programs which exceed the categorical grants provided by
the state. Slip op. at 118-19, 288-90.
100. But cf. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967). In that case, the court held
that where black children are denied an integrated education, whether because of the density of
residential segregation or for other reasons, the school system is constitutionally required to
provide compensatory education "sufficient at least to overcome the detriment of segregation
and thus provide, as nearly as possible, equal educational opportunity to all schoolchildren."
Id. at 515.
101. See, e.g., New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
102. See, e.g., Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Cf. Frederick L. v.
Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (failure to provide special instruction aimed at the
learning handicaps of learning disabled children might violate the equal protection clause under
a "strict rationality" construction).
The law is clearer regarding those handicapped children who are totally excluded from
public education, although no such case has yet been before the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973) (consent decree); Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972) (decided on statutory as well as constitutional grounds);
Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (consent decree). All three of these cases were decided on federal equal protection
grounds before the Rodriguez decision was handed down by the United States Supreme Court.
Since that case was decided, a federal district court in Ohio has upheld a state statute excluding
children from the public schools who are "incapable of profiting substantially by further
instruction," relying on the reasoning of Rodriguez. Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded
Children & Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
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Some education reformers have argued that the "linguistically handicapped" (students of limited English-speaking ability), receiving an education intended for the typical English-speaking pupil, are also functionally
excluded from an education when they are compelled to sit in a classroom in
which they cannot communicate. This, they have argued, is a violation of
the equal protection clause. 10 3 When this question reached the Supreme
Court in Lau v. Nichols, 10 4 however, the Court avoided the constitutional
issue. Although the majority stated that teaching non-English-speaking
students exclusively in English deprives them of "any meaningful education," the decision relied solely on section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the implementing regulations, 10 5 which the Court interpreted as
requiring those school districts which received federal funds to provide
assistance to students with English-language deficiencies. Thus the question
of whether there is a constitutional right to have the school system affirmatively rectify the language deficiencies of non-English-speaking children has
not been resolved by the Supreme Court or even by the lower courts. In the
remedial phase of the Denver school desegregation case of Keyes v. School
DistrictNo. 1 ,16 for example, the Tenth Circuit, although acknowledging
that some minimal quantity of education may be a fundamental right, held
that Hispanic students were not "entitled under the fourteenth amendment to
an educational experience tailored to their unique cultural and developmen07
tal needs." 1
In general, courts seem reluctant to find a constitutional violation
where a school system has failed to meet the relative educational needs of
different kinds of students. The principle of educational "need" differentials has been easier to grasp in the context of devising a remedy to an
established constitutional violation such as segregated schools or where it
can be shown that children have been totally excluded from a public
103. Roos, The PotentialImpact of Rodriguez on Other School Reform Litigation, 38 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 566, 573 (1974), reprinted in FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM 268, 275 (B. Levin ed. 1974).
104. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970).
106. 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976). The district court had
ordered school authorities to implement, on a pilot basis, a plan based on the theory that the
poor school performance of minority children results from the fact that most school systems,
since they are geared to meeting the needs of middle-class Anglo children, fail to meet the
different needs of poor minority children. 521 F.2d at 480. The circuit court found that this
comprehensive bilingual-bicultural program could be justified neither on the ground that it is

essential to effectuate meaningful segregation in the schools nor on the ground that it is an
appropriate remedy for the inferior education which minority children in Denver received. Id.
at 481-82. Hence, although the Hispanic children were entitled to an opportunity to acquire
proficiency in the English language, they were not entitled to a remedy requiring the school
district to adapt to their cultural and economic needs. Id. at 483.
107. 521 F.2d at 482.
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education. It is harder for courts to deal with the principle as a constitutional
right in and of itself-that a certain amount of education, which amount will
vary depending upon the category of pupil under consideration, is in itself a
constitutional right to be provided by school authorities regardless of cost. 108
There is as yet no clear statement from the Supreme Court of the United
States that school authorities are constitutionally compelled to affirmatively
overcome deficiencies not of their own making-whether these "deficiencies" are of language, poverty, birth and disease or, in the case of the school
finance suits, geographic location. It is likely, however, that following the
example of the school finance reform litigation, suits seeking to compel
"appropriate education" according to the needs of different categories of
students will be brought on state rather than federal constitutional grounds.
Even when such cases are brought on state constitutional grounds, however,
the primary concern will be the difficulty plaintiffs would have convincing
courts that there are "judicially manageable standards." Nevertheless, these
"education need" suits illustrate the pressures that are likely to be brought
to bear on any school finance reform effort-that it recognize the needs of
certain high cost students as part of the litigative strategy or the remedy.
4. Income Differentials. One court has raised the question of income differentials in the context of a school financing scheme which relies
on local tax effort even where property wealth is equalized. In the Cincinnati case, local tax effort was found to be closely related to the ability of a
district's residents to pay property taxes to support education, which, of
course, is strongly related to family income. 109 In other words, the disparities in educational offerings are due to disparities in income wealth as
well as property wealth. Thus a district power equalizing provision which
did not equalize income disparities would very likely be held unconstitutional by that court. 110
E.

Fiscal Neutrality: A Flexible Approach.

It appears that school finance reform litigation based on the education
and equal protection clauses of state constitutions will continue. However,
108. Several actions have recently been filed which will test this theory in the area of
bilingual education. These cases do not allege that Hispanic students are effectively foreclosed

from any meaningful education; rather they argue that the programs provided are inadequate to
enable them to participate equally in the learning process with other children in the school
system. See Ramos v. Gaines, C.A. No. H-76-38 (D. Conn., filed Jan. 26, 1976) (summarized in
9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 778 (1976)); Rios v. Read, No. 75 C 296 (E.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 25,
1975) (9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 114 (1975)); Lopez v. Thomas, C.A. No. 75-14 (E.D. Pa., Jan.
6, 1975) (8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 735 (1976)). These cases are concerned with the adequacy of
the response of school authorities to the Supreme Court's decision in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974), so they are grounded in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act rather than the constitution.
109. Cincinnati,slip op. at 287.
110. Id., slip op. at 386, 389.
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as efforts increase to introduce into the litigation the special needs of cities
or of certain target pupil populations-such as the physically and mentally
handicapped and the students of limited English-speaking ability-a variety
of constitutional standards or theories will be required. The "fiscal neutrality" theory in Serrano was a negative standard which merely said that
educational opportunities could not be a function of local school district
property wealth. This standard has subsequently been broadened: educational opportunities may not be a function of local school district fiscal
capacity, which in the case of cities, means that fiscal capacity must reflect
municipal and education overburden as well as property wealth.111 Still
another negative standard that is being put forward states that educational
opportunities may not be a function of the whims and preferences of school
district voters, meaning that the level of expenditures in any district cannot
depend on the willingness of local school district voters to approve tax
levies. 112 Finally, there are those cases which have argued for the application of an "affirmative duty" or "education need" standard. This standard
differs from the fiscal neutrality principle in that it requires the state to
provide a certain educational "floor" to be guaranteed by the state, whereas
the fiscal neutrality standard would permit a system which maintained
expenditure disparities as long as those disparities were based on local voter
choice.1 13 The "needs" standard, in its ultimate form, requires additional
resources for pupils with special needs, the level of expenditures being
appropriate for the needs of each category of pupil.
Not only is a single legal theory-fiscal neutrality-no longer appropriate for challenging the constitutionality of school finance systems of
every state, but also no one approach is appropriate to remedy the inequities
uncovered in the various court cases. For example, equalizing school district
fiscal capacity by using fiscal measures which take into account the higher
cost of education in cities would also help suburban districts but not rural
districts.11 4 On the other hand, the use of a per pupil or per capita income
11.

See, e.g., Cincinnati; Post-Trial Review of the Evidence for Plaintiffs-Intervenors,

Board of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, supra note 74. The Cincinnaticase further suggests that
educational opportunities may not be a function of local school district family income as well as
property wealth. Slip op. at 386.
112. See, e.g., Cincinnati; Seattle School District. The Cincinnati case articulated the
standard as follows:
The quality of a child's education must not be a function of any factor irrelevant to

that child's educationalneeds, such as the property wealth or income wealth of his
school district or of the willingness of the voters of his district to pass tax levies or
bond issues.
Slip op. at 389 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g. Serrano II, 18 Cal. 3d at 747, 557 P.2d at 939, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (endorsing

district power equalizing as one possible constitutional alternative).
114. The Florida legislature has attempted to deal with the problem of cost differentials by
including an adjustment based on cost-of-living differences among districts as part of its
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measure to determine fiscal capacity rather than per pupil property values
would help rural areas but not cities. Use of such an income measure,
however, prevents districts with high income but low property values from
obtaining an undue advantage from a district power equalizing provision. "15
An alternative approach is to use a "circuit-breaker" provision" 16 to provide
tax relief to low income homeowners or renters residing in any type of
district. This will help both rural and urban districts.
The "costing out" of state requirements for each type of district as a
measure of that "basic education" which a state must provide 117 will take
into account the "cost differentials" problem of cities, the problem of
"diseconomies of scale" which small rural districts often face, and the
problem of those districts which have insufficient revenues because of low
property wealth or the unwillingness of local voters to approve property tax
levies. On the other hand, a cost differentials standard also has its difficulties. Adjustments which reflect the actual teacher education-experience
characteristics of a school district rest upon the assumption that teachers
with advanced degrees and/or experience are not an educational benefit but a
fixed cost because of the tenure system. If the contrary assumption is
made-that is, that higher education and experience levels reflect quantitative differences in educational resources-then rural, rather than urban,
areas should be given additional funds to enable those districts to attract
teachers with more education and experience. Similarly, accounting for the
higher salaries of urban area teachers with equivalent education and experience levels may reflect cost-of-living differences which are beyond the
control of school officials or may reflect the weak collective bargaining
stance of the urban school board. There are also political problems, since the
application of such a standard would allocate more funds to suburbs as well
as central cities, and away from rural areas.
recently enacted school aid formula. FLA.

STAT. ANN.

§ 236.081(3) (West Supp. 1977). The use

of this cost-of-living index has benefitted urban areas-with increases in aid from 7 to 10
percent, although the cost of living is not identical to the cost of education. Callahan & Wilken,
State School Finance Reform in the 1970's, in SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: A LEGISLATOR'S
HANDBOOK

7 (J. Callahan & W. Wilken eds. 1976).

115. See Cincinnati, discussed at text accompanying notes 109-10 supra.
116. A "circuit-breaker" tax relief provision cuts in when the property tax burden reaches a
percentage of family income that the state considers excessive. The excess is recovered by the

taxpayer either through credit against his state income tax liability or as a direct cash refund if
he has no state income tax liability. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BIG BREAKTHROUGH FOR CIRCUIT-BREAKER 3 (ACIR Information Bull. No. 73-2, 1973).
For examples of such legislation, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 206.520 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 273.012 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 310.640 (1975); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 79.10(3), 79.17 (West Cum. Supp. 1977).

117. See Seattle School District, slip op. at 54-56, discussed at notes 79, 81, 83-87 supra and
text accompanying notes 76-87.
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Taking into account the higher cost of students with special needseither by weighting the basic aid per pupil formula by a factor representing
the additional resources needed for each type of pupil 1 8 or by providing
categorical aid programs' 9-- can help both cities and rural areas which have
higher proportions of disadvantaged youth than suburban districts. Pupilweighting systems insure that funds that are allocated for special needs and
programs are equalized. Such systems have another advantage over categor-

ical programs in that districts heavily burdened by students requiring higher
cost programs are not subject to the annual appropriations compromises in

state legislatures. But a weighted pupil formula raises a number of problems
as well. There is as yet no adequate way to derive the various cost factors to
be applied since the evidence regarding the nature and amount of resources
necessary to have a measurable impact on pupil performance is limited and
mixed. On the other hand, the advantage of categorical programs is that
legislators can more readily insure that the additional funds are actually
spent on the target pupil populations rather than dispersed throughout the
district as general funds.120 The categorical allocation process, howeverexcept where the state fully funds the excess costs of the categorical
program-often results in levels of expenditure that are directly related to
2
the property wealth of a district.' 1
118. Florida has 26 programs, and a cost factor is assigned according to the relative cost of
educating a student in each of the programs. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.081(l) (West 1977). The
range is from a cost factor of 1.0 for grades 4 through 9 to a cost factor of 15.0 for hospital and
home bound instruction. For example, Florida uses a cost factor of 4.0 for deaf students,
meaning that the base student cost ($755 for 1975-76) is multiplied by 4.0 for each deaf student
in a school district for a total of $3020 for each such student. In its initial reform legislation,
Florida weighted the base student cost by 0.05 for each disadvantaged student. This was
subsequently repealed, 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-227, § 3, and aid for compensatory programs is
now provided via a supplement added to the base student cost for each disadvantaged student.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.081(2) (West 1977).
Minnesota employs two factors to provide additional resources for disadvantaged children.
First, a child from a family receiving Aid to Dependent Children is counted as 1.5 pupil units.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.17(4) (West Cum. Supp. 1977). Second, in school districts in which
such children exceed five percent of the total actual pupil units, each such pupil is counted as an
additional one-tenth of a pupil unit for each percent of concentration over five percent. Id. §
124.17(5). See generally Leppert, Huxel, Garms & Fuller, Pupil Weighting Formulas in School
Finance Reforms, in SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM: A LEGISLATOR'S HANDBOOK 12 (J. Callahan &
W. Wilken eds. 1976).
119. Many more states have adopted this route than have adopted the "weighted pupil"
formula strategy. California has taken this approach, apportioning funds for compensatory
programs based on district need, as determined by an index of three factors: the proportion of
limited English-speaking students, of family poverty and of pupil transiency. CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 54000 (West Supp. 1976).
120. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 237.34 (West Supp. 1977), which attempts to insure that 80
percent of funds generated by the weightings are spent in the school with the appropriate pupils
by requiring that expenditures for each program be reported on a school-by-school basis.
121. See Unified School Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas (Shawnee County Dist. Ct., Kan., filed
Dec. 21, 1976), in which plaintiffs alleged that state aid for categorical programs (transporta-
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In summary, the development of varying legal standards, based on
different definitions of equal educational opportunity, means that the legal
remedies that are developed will be tailored to the specific characteristics of
individual states. Moreover, no single remedy is likely to be adequate;
rather, some combination of remedies will be necessary, the particular
combination addressing the types of fiscal inequities that are most prevalent
in a state's school finance system.
IV.

SCHOOL

FINANCE REFORM AND COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES

Between 1971 and 1975 there was a significant amount of school
finance reform activity in the state legislatures. During this period, major
reform legislation, bringing about substantial equality in the raising and
distribution of education revenues, was passed in a number of states-some
under pressure of litigation and some to head off litigation. 122 While a
significant number of states continue to consider and enact reform measures,
the pace of reform and the extent to which such legislation lessens the
disparities in per pupil expenditures may have diminished.
A.

The Rodriguez Spillover Effect.

Although some legal challenges to school finance systems continued to
percolate through the state courts, the Rodriguez decision slowed the
momentum and took much of the pressure off state legislatures. Moreover,
the receptivity of state courts to a school finance reform suit was considerably less uniform than it had been in the wake of Serrano. Many state
courts are reluctant to outpace the United States Supreme Court, which had
refused to find that relative differences among districts in per pupil spending
was a denial of equal protection to those students in low-spending districts.
The desire to preserve "local control" 12 3 and the pervasive view that there is
little demonstrable correlation between per pupil expenditures and the quality of education' 2 4 combine to deter many state court judges from striking out
into the uncharted area of fiscal and educational policy.
tion, special education and vocational education) is not "power equalized" and hence fails to
take into consideration the ability of individual districts to finance such services, in violation of
the Kansas Constitution. See also Cincinnati.
122. The reform legislation enacted in the years immediately following Serrano is discussed
in Grubb, The First Round of Legislative Reforms in the Post-Serrano World, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 459 (1974), reprintedin FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 161
(B. Levin ed. 1974).
123. In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has suggested that local control or local
autonomy in public education is a very substantial interest. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50; Wright v. Council of the
City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 478 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting-local control is of
"overriding importance").
124. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42-43.

Vol. 1977:1099]

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION

1127

There are only five states 12 which are under a court mandate to reform
their school finance systems. These victories for reform occurred over a
period of four years. This is in sharp contrast with the pre-Rodriguez
progress when seven states fell under court order to revise their school
126
financing systems within an eighteen month period.
B.

FiscalPressures.

The costs of implementing court orders extending education to those
previously excluded from a public education, either actually or functionally-such as the mentally and physically handicapped or those of limited
English-speaking ability-have clearly had an impact on the availability of
resources for general fiscal equalization. These suits, in establishing the
right--constitutional or statutory-to an "appropriate" education for children with special needs, may even rob resources from the regular program
under the present funding scheme. As one court said, in ordering suitable
education to be provided previously unserved or inadequately served handicapped students:
[T]he District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded children
clearly must outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources.
If sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the services and
programs that are needed and desirable in the system then the available
funds must be expended equitably in such a manner that no child is
entirely excluded from a publicly supported education consistent with
his needs and ability to benefit therefrom. The inadequacies of the...
[District of Columbia school system] whether occasioned by insufficient funding or administrative inefficiency, certainly cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on the "exceptional" or handicapped child
than on the normal child. 127
In addition to the court suits on behalf of those with special education
needs, the increasing pressure on state legislatures by handicapped and
128
bilingual student interest groups for substantial categorical aid programs
125. These states are California, Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio and Washington. In the
latter two states, the lower court decisions are being appealed.

126. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
127. Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972). In Mills, defendant
school district conceded that it was under an affirmative duty to provide handicapped plaintiffs
and persong in their class with a publicly supported education tailored to their needs and had
failed to do so. The defendant argued, however, that diverting funds specifically appropriated
for other educational services to improve special educational services would violate an act of
Congress and would be inequitable to children outside plaintiffs' class. Id. at 871-75. The court
rejected this defense.
128. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 5767-5767.18 (West 1977) (bilingual program); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §§ 6801-6896 (West 1977) (handicapped program); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 388.1141a
(1972) (bilingual program); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 77-23-2 (1973) (bilingual program). See also
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, § 2, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1426 (Supp. V
1975).
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has also reduced the available monies for general fiscal equalization.
Moreover, these categorical programs are in themselves often anti-equalizing-with wealthier districts able to qualify for more such aid than poorer
districts-and thus efforts to reform school finance can be undercut. As a
result, those seeking state categorical aid programs and state compliance
with the extensive requirements of such federal laws as the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act' 29 may be on a collision course with those
seeking general school finance reform.
Another reason for the limited nature of current school finance reform
efforts is the disappearance of the state fiscal surpluses which had existed in
1972-73,130 in combination with the expanding cost of education and the
demands of other public services on state revenues. Declining enrollment is
still another factor having an impact on school finance reform. The bonuses
provided districts experiencing substantial losses in enrollment may offset
equalization efforts, since many of the districts affected are small, high13
wealth districts. 1
C.

"Backlash" Litigation.

Finally, the spate of "backlash" litigation-legal challenges to the
new school finance reforms enacted by some states-has affected the reform
movement in those and perhaps in other states. Many of these reforms are
33
132
quite controversial, in particular, maximum tax rates or revenue levels, 1
134
ceilings on the annual rate of increase in per pupil expenditure levels,
changes in the measures of district wealth, 135 and district power equalizing
formulas. 136 Some of these are now under fire in the courts.
1. District Power Equalizing Provisions. Under a "pure" district
power equalizing formula, 137 the state "recaptures" revenues raised in
excess of the predetermined spending level and distributes the excess (together with additional state funds, if necessary) to poorer school districts
129. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1426 (Supp. V 1975).
130. See Levin, School FinanceReform in a Post-Rodriguez World, in NATIONAL ORGANIZATION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EDUC., CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROBLEMS IN EDUC. 156, 172

(1975).
131. Education Commission of the States, The Fiscal Impacts of Declining Enrollments 9,
15 (1976).
132. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 18-8 (Smith-Hurd Sbpp. 1977); UTAH CODE ANN. §
53-7-24 (Supp. 1977).
133. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 22-50-106 to -108 (Cum. Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 72-7055 & -7065 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
134. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 42232, 42238 & 42244 (West 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
72-7055 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
135. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-7040 to -7042 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
136. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20, §§ 3742-3748 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.02.08 (West Supp. 1977).
137. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
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where, because of low property values, the selected tax rates cannot generate sufficient revenues to meet the predetermined per pupil expenditure
levels.138 Under Montana's new school finance legislation, enacted in 1972,
each school district is guaranteed eighty percent of the "maximum general
fund budget" (the foundation program), financed through a required forty
mill property tax. 139 Montana's legislation does have a "recapture" provision, since a district having sufficiently high property values that the forty
mill tax raises more per pupil than the state guarantee must remit the excess
revenues to the state, which are then redistributed to those areas where a
forty mill tax rate does not generate the state-guaranteed amount. 140
In Woodahl v. Straub,14 1 wealthy school districts challenged Montana's new school finance reform law on the ground that they were being
taxed "for the exclusive use and benefit of others," inasmuch as they would
have to remit substantial sums to the state for the support of other school
districts. 142 The plaintiffs alleged that this violated the Montana Constitution
which requires the legislature to "fully fund" the school system. 143 They
further alleged that the new law, by discriminating against the taxpayers of
wealthy areas, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution. 144
The Montana Supreme Court held, however, that the forty mill tax
was, in effect, a statewide uniform property tax levied for a public purpose
in accord with the Montana Constitution, 145 rather than a tax levied on one
district for the benefit of another, and therefore did not violate the Montana
Constitution. The legislature could carry out its mandate to "fully fund" the
state's share of the cost of basic education by using a statewide property tax
rather than income and sales taxes. 146 The fact that some areas did not
receive benefits directly proportional to the amount contributed was not,
according to the court, a valid objection to a tax which benefits the state as a
whole. 147
138. Under some of the newly enacted school finance reform laws, the bulk of school
revenues is distributed through foundation or flat grant formulas, the power equalized portion
constituting only an optional "add-on." Moreover, the power equalized portion of the school

finance formula often is not in its "pure" form-that is, the revenues that wealthier districts
raise in excess of that guaranteed by the state at the chosen tax rates are not subject to
"recapture" by the state. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 20906.1-.4 (West Supp. 1977).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 75-6906,-6912 & -6913 (Supp. 1977).
Id.
164 Mont. 141, 520 P.2d 776 (1974).
Id. at 147. 520 P.2d at 779.
Id. at 147, 520 P.2d at 778. See MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1.

144. 164 Mont. at 147, 520 P.2d at.778.
1.

145. "Taxes shall be levied by general laws for public purposes." MONT. CoNsr. art. VIII, §

146. 164 Mont. at 148-49, 520 P.2d at 780.
147. Id. at 151, 520 P.2d at 781.
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By contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Buse v. Smith 148 found
the "negative-aid" provisions of that state's newly enacted school finance
law to be in violation of the uniform taxation provision of the Wisconsin
Constitution. 149 Wisconsin had adopted a district power equalization factor
based on the taxable property wealth located within each school district.
Those districts in which the per pupil property values exceeded the state
guaranteed valuation were required to pay a portion of their property tax
revenues into the state general fund for redistribution to other school districts. Thus the formula is designed to insure equal tax dollars for education
from equal tax effort, regardless of the disparity in tax base.
Taxpayers and parents residing in negative-aid districts (the "recapture" districts) brought suit challenging the negative-aid provisions of the
newly enacted school finance formula. The plurality opinion held that even
assuming that equal educational opportunity-a fundamental right under the
Wisconsin Constitution-requires equal dollars per pupil or equalization of
the power to raise revenues, "if the means chosen to accomplish that end
violates other provisions of the constitution, it must be held invalid."' 5 0
"Local control" was elevated to the level of a constitutional right, the court
declaring that the constitution preserves the right of local districts "to
provide educational opportunities over and above those required by the state
and they retain the power to raise and spend revenue .... -151
The court, not very convincingly, reasoned that even if the funds raised
through the negative-aid provision were for a state-wide purpose, such as
education, the tax was a local tax if levied directly by a political subdivision
of the state. 152 Although the state could levy a statewide property tax to
support education, the taxes involved in the new legislation were local taxes
since whether the tax is a state or a local tax depends on the entity that levies
the tax and not the purpose for which the tax was levied. The court found
that the uniformity rule requires that "local" taxes be spent in the taxing
jurisdiction-that is, the school district, and that the "state cannot compel
one school district to levy and collect a tax for the direct benefit of other
school districts, or for the sole benefit of the state .. -153 without
violating the uniformity rule of taxation in Wisconsin's constitution. 154 The
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
WIs. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1.
74 Wis. 2d at 567-68, 247 N.W.2d at 149.
Id. at 572, 247 N.W.2d at 151.
Id. at 573, 247 N.W.2d at 152. The concurring opinion argued that the negative-aid

provision was a state tax, but the result was the same as if it were a local tax.
153. Id. at 579, 247 N.W.2d at 155.
154. WIs. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 1. The dissent had by far the more convincing argument. As
long as the state does not impose a tax on one local government-rather than all local
governments-for state purposes, the statutory provisions in question should be upheld. 74

Vol. 1977:1099]

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION

1131

same result could have been reached under a statewide property tax, according to the court, without running afoul of the constitution. Yet such a
scheme would have been more restrictive of "local control," which the
court found to be a constitutional right. As one commentator has pointed
out, the Wisconsin court has put the state "into a circle of contradictory
constitutional limitations on legislative options to equalize education opportunity.' ' 55 The court indicated that education is a fundamental right and

thus a wealth-related school financing scheme challenged under the state
equal protection clause would be subject to strict scrutiny. On the other
hand, a district power equalizing statute which sought to free the tie between
expenditures and wealth would also violate the state constitution, even
though it would provide a measure of local control in that districts could

choose their desired level of expenditure. In addition, full state funding,
without local leeway, would violate the constitutional right of local districts
"to provide educational opportunities over and above those required by the
56
state."1

What is the likelihood that other district power equalizing statutesparticularly those with "recapture" provisions-will be successfully challenged as violating a state's "uniformity of taxation" clause in its constitution? First, there are several types of "uniformity clauses," subject to
varying interpretations. One commentator has found that there are nine
Wis. 2d at 594-95, 247 N.W.2d at 162. Moreover, "[a] local government raising funds for a state
purpose does not violate the uniformity clause or public purpose doctrine-if it can be shown
that the unit also has an interest in the state purpose." Id.
The dissent thus concludes that "school districts, as a matter of constitutional law, [do not]
have an absolute, unqualified right to the full revenues raised by the property tax within their
districts." Id. at 599, 247 N.W.2d at 164.
155. Note, State ConstitutionalRestrictions on School Finance Reform: Buse v. Smith, 90
HARv. L. REV. 1528, 1538 (1977).
156. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d at 572, 247 N.W. 2d at 151.
Maine's power equalizing provision, which provided for full "recapture" of excess revenues, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3711-3713 (Supp. 1973), repealed by 1975 Me. Acts,
ch. 660, was also challenged. Boothbay v. Longley, No. 75-918 (Kennebec Super. Ct., Me.,
filed July 18, 1975). Under the school financing statute, a uniform school property tax rate was
applied statewide. The revenues raised were then distributed by the state to school districts in
such a way that high property wealth districts actually received less revenue than they
generated. The statute limits the amount these districts can spend to the amount spent in the
preceding year. High property wealth districts attacked this scheme, alleging that it was an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of the state constitution, as well as
in violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and equivalent provisions in Maine's constitution. However, after
the suit was filed, the legislature amended the school finance law, revising its "recapture"
provision. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 3742-3753 (Supp. 1976). In November, 1977, the
statewide property tax was repealed by referendum so that it is possible that the suit may never
be prosecuted. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, supra note 70, at 10-11.
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different types of uniformity clauses, 15 7 while at least three states have no

uniformity clause at all. 158 In addition to variations in constitutional
phraseology, there are differences among the courts of the various states as
to how restrictively the uniformity clause is to be interpreted. Some courts
regard the uniformity requirement as more restrictive than the equal protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions while others regard
them as virtually synonymous.1 59 Unlike Wisconsin, most courts, however,

consider that the uniformity rule applies only to the raising of taxes and not
to the distribution of the proceeds.160
2. District Income as a Measure of District Wealth. In Kansas,
following Caldwell v. State, 161 a Serrano-type decision in 1972 which ruled
that the existing method of financing schools in the state was unconstitutional, the state legislature enacted a new school financing scheme. 162 This
157. W. NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION 9-11
(1959).

158. The three states are Connecticut, Iowa and New York.
159. Note, Taxation-UniformityRequirements, 38 Ky. L.J. 503, 521 (1950). See, e.g., Buse
v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 575, 247 N.W.2d 141, 153 (1976) (citing Knowlton v. Supervisors of
Rock County, 9 Wis. 378, 420-21 (1895)); Sweetwater County Planning Comm. for Org. of
School Dist. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234, 1236-37 (Wyo. 1971).
160. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Gilmore, 109 Me. 169, 83 A. 673 (1912). That case involved a
uniform tax with a differential distribution of the proceeds of the tax. The statute under
challenge imposed a uniform statewide property tax on all property in the state, but distributed
the proceeds differentially. Unorganized townships received none of the proceeds, while cities,
towns and plantations received aid under a formula which provided that one-third of the funds
were to be distributed in accordance with the number of pupils and two-thirds in accordance
with property values-thus benefiting those cities and towns with high property values more
than those with low property values. Id. at 178, 83 A. at 677. With regard to the question of
whether unorganized townships could be excluded from the distribution scheme although their
properties were taxed along with all other property in the state, the court declared:
The fundamental question is this: Is the purpose for which the tax is assessed a public
purpose. . . . In order that taxation may be equal and uniform in the constitutional
sense, it is not necessary that the benefits arising therefrom should be enjoyed by all
the people in equal degree, nor that each one of the people should participate in each
particular benefit.
Id. at 176, 83 A. at 676. In sum, "inequality of assessment is necessarily fatal, inequality of
distribution is not, provided the purpose be the public welfare." Id. at 178, 83 A. at 677.
161. No. 50616 (Johnson County Dist. Ct., Kan., Aug. 30, 1972).
162. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7030 to -7080 (Supp. 1976). The Caldwell plaintiffs and crossclaimants thereupon filed a joint motion requesting a ruling that the newly enacted School
District Equalization Act did not violate constitutional guarantees. In a memorandum decision,
the trial court judge held that the new financing system "place[s] the state in a fiscally neutral
stance with regard to local school districts and [does] not arbitrarily cause the quality of a
child's education to be a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors." Caldwell, slip op.
at 2.
In March of 1973, the Supreme Court decided Rodriguez. In July, when the Caldwell
plaintiffs again came before the Kansas district court, the judge distinguished Caldwell from
Rodriguez on the basis of the difference in factual and legal circumstances present in the two
cases. Although Texas had a similar "tax lid" provision, that tax lid did "not restrict increases
in expenditures nearly to the extent the Kansas tax lid did." Id., slip op. at 3. In Texas, state
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legislation was then challenged in Knowles v. State163 by plaintiffs from
districts which, under the measure of "district wealth" established by the
statute, received zero state equalization aid. The plaintiffs objected to the
fact that the district power equalization formula defined "district wealth" to
164
include taxable income although it is not subject to tax by school districts,
and the fact that the real property values are adjusted by the application of
county urban and rural sales ratios-which generally discriminates against
districts in predominantly rural areas. These features, together with the
imposition of a budget limitation freezing the relative inequalities existing at
the time the law was enacted, were held, as to the individual plaintiff
taxpayers, to violate both the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and section 1 of the Kansas
Bill of Rights inasmuch as there was no rational basis for the classification
"in the receipt of such benefits from, and imposition of burdens to support,
the educational interests of the State."1 6 5 The act was further held to violate
the provisions of the Kansas Constitution relating to uniform taxation and
the uniform operation of state laws, in its distribution of state funds. 166 The
legislation was amended and the case has since been remanded to the trial
court by the state supreme court for consideration of the amended law's
167
actual effect on plaintiff districts.
law placed a ceiling of $1.50 per $100 assessed valuation on the tax rate, but the Edgewood
School District, in which the plaintiffs resided, did not tax at a rate that approached that ceiling.
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 12 (1973). By contrast, the repealed
Kansas law had provided that no district could budget more than 105 percent of the amount
budgeted for the previous school year or in the 1969-70 school year, whichever was greater.
1970 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 402, § 12 (repealed 1973). In addition, tax levies could not exceed
those levied for the base year of 1969-70. 1970 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 401, § 2 (repealed 1973).
Secondly, Texas' system for determining the amount of state aid to which districts were entitled
was a function of the wealth of each district whereas the Kansas system for determining the
level of state aid which a school district was to receive was based on an economic index
computed on a countywide basis. "State aid to counties bore no rational relationship to the
actual needs of individual districts ....Caldwell, slip op. at 3. Lastly, the Caldwell court
compared the variation in per pupil expenditures for each state and noted that the variations
were much more extreme in Kansas than in Texas. The judge thus held to his decision that there
was an identifiable suspect class under the Kansas system. Id., slip op. at 4. Furthermore, since
the Caldwell challenge was based on the equal protection clauses of the Kansas constitution as
well as the federal constitution, the state constitution with its more explicit language regarding
education allowed the court to maintain its position that education is a fundamental right in
Kansas. Id. Thus, the Caldwell decision was unaffected by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez.
163. No. 8319 (Chautauqua County Dist. Ct., Kan., Feb. 25, 1975). Another complaint
recently filed also challenges the use of taxable income as a measure of district wealth. See
Complaint at 3, Unified School Dist. No. 229 v. Kansas (Shawnee County Dist. Ct., Kan., filed
Dec. 1977).
164. Knowles, slip op. at 31.
165. Id., Conclusions of Law at 2.
166. Id., Conclusions of Law at 5.
167. Judgment was entered in February of 1975 but was not to be effective until July 1975 so
as to allow the Kansas legislature an opportunity to amend the act. Id., slip op. at 2-3. After the
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Cost Differentials. In Florida in District School Board of Bay

County v. Departmentof Education,16 forty-three school districts filed suit
challenging the use of certain factors in determining the cost-of-living

differential as violative of the Florida Constitution. Prior to 1974, the state
board of education recommended to the legislature the cost-of-living factors
which the legislature was to use to determine the district cost differentials. 169
The provision referring to the state board's recommendations was eliminated in 1974.170 In 1976, a standardized formula for computing district cost
differentials, based on the Florida Price Level Index, was adopted.17 1
However, the plaintiff districts sought indemnification for lost revenues for
the period during which the challenged factors were used. In the final
consent judgment, the court commended the use of cost-of-living differentials as a step toward the achievement of the state constitutional mandate
to provide a "uniform system of free public schools." 172

4.

The Avoidance of Full Compliance. Because of pressures at the

state level for categorical assistance to such groups as the physically and
mentally handicapped, the diminution of state fiscal surpluses which were
available to state legislators in the early seventies, together with the expanding cost of education and the demands of other public services on state
legislature amended various sections of the law, the trial court dismissed the case as moot.
Knowles v. State Bd. of Educ., 219 Kan. 271, 274, 547 P.2d 699,702 (1976). Plaintiffs appealed
to the Kansas Supreme Court, which noted that significant changes had occurred in the
legislation which could have a substantial impact on the effect of the act, including a decrease in
the number of school districts not receiving any state aid. Id. at 276-77, 547 P.2d at 703-04. The
state supreme court therefore reversed the district court's decision to dismiss the case as moot
and remanded. The state supreme court, citing Rodriguez, noted that
the present case is one where the presumption of constitutionality which attends every
legislative act can be overcome only by the most explicit demonstration that the
method of classification and the payments made results in a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes.
Id. at 278, 547 P.2d at 704.
The Kansas School District Equalization Act has been further amended, causing plaintiffs
to file a supplemental amended petition on February 11, 1977, alleging that in spite of the
changes brought about by the recent amendments, the Kansas legislature had failed to correct
the inequalities and deficiencies alleged to exist in the original Knowles complaint. Supplemental Amended Petition, Knowles v. State Bd. of Educ., No. 8319 (Chautauqua County Dist. Ct.,
Kan., filed Feb. 1I, 1977). Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that the so-called improvements
had created additional arbitrary classifications. The plaintiffs maintained, therefore, that since
the recent amendments had not had a healing effect on the 1973 Act, the original conclusion of
the Chautauqua County District Court-that the Kansas School District Equalization Act was
in violation of the Bill of Rights and Constitution of the state of Kansas and of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution-should remain in effect. Id.
168. No. 73-1747 (Leon County Cir. Ct., Fla.) (final consent judgment, June 2, 1977).
169. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-345, § 2.
170. 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-227, § 3.
171. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-259, § 2.
172. Bay County, Final Consent Judgment at 6.
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revenues, the increase in districts experiencing declining enrollment and
political pressures from wealthier districts, legislatures have often enacted
school finance laws which were not in compliance with the court decisions.
The statutes were not fully funded or were loaded down with save-harmless
clauses, permissive voter overrides of expenditure or tax rate limitations,
bonuses for declining enrollment districts and other devices for protecting
the status quo. Thus, in addition to the spate of "backlash" litigation
directed against newly enacted reforms-brought largely by those districts
which had benefited under the previous system-some of the plaintiffs who
had successfully challenged the old school finance mechanisms have returned to court to challenge the new school finance laws for failing to comply
fully with the constitutional standard as articulated by the courts.
The history of the Robinson litigation in New Jersey convincingly
illustrates the problem. As a result of plaintiff's repeated returns to court,
there are six Robinson opinions. In Robinson V,' 173 the court found the
legislature's definition of a "thorough and efficient" education, enacted as
part of the Public School Education Act of 1975,114 constitutionally acceptable, but emphasized that without adequate funds, the 1975 Act was not in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. When the legislature failed to
schools
fully fund the Act, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered 7 the
5
1
passed.
was
measure
revenue-raising
closed until an adequate
California has a similar-though not as complex-history of plaintiffs
seeking to challenge newly enacted legislation as less than what the constitution requires. When Serrano was remanded for trial, the lower court
reviewed the legislation enacted in response to the state supreme court's
initial decision and determined that it failed to meet the constitutional
standard articulated by the higher court. The failure of the newly-enacted
legislation to pass constitutional muster was affirmed in SerranoII, largely
because substantial wealth-related disparities in per pupil spending would
continue to exist under the new legislation. The state supreme court emphasized that the major feature of the reform which served to perpetuate the
inequities was
the continued availability of voted tax overrides which, while providing
more affluent districts with a ready means for meeting what they
conceive as legitimate and proper educational objectives, will be recognized by the poorer districts, unable to support the passage of such
overrides in order to meet equally desired objectives, as but a new and
more invidious aspect of that "cruel illusion" which we found to be
inherent in the former system. 176
173.
174.
175.
176.

69 N.J. 449, 355 A.2d 129 (1976).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 7A-5 (West 1975).
Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976) (Robinson VI).
18 Cal. 3d at 767, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
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The court thus found that the California public school financing system still
made the educational opportunity available to students a function of the
77
taxable wealth of the districts in which they lived. 1

The California legislature made another pass at reform, adopting Assembly Bill 65 (AB 65) in September, 1977.178 The plaintiffs subsequently
petitioned the California Supreme Court seeking invalidation of those features of AB 65 thought to be out of compliance with Serrano ff. 179 The
plaintiffs alleged that the retention of such features as the permissive tax
overrides 180 and the basic aid grant of $120 per pupil' 8' (reduced from $125
under the previous financing scheme) would perpetuate wealth-related disparities between districts of greater than $100 per pupil. 18 2 The supreme
court, however, rather than ruling on the petition as an original matter, has
sent plaintiffs back to the trial court.183
V.

CONCLUSION

Legal challenges to inequitable school finance systems, based on state
constitutional provisions, will undoubtedly continue, spurred on by the
recent success of such litigation as Horton in Connecticut. The relatively
simple "fiscal neutrality" theory which, after Serrano, became the sole
legal strategy for school finance reform in the early seventies, still persists.
But a wider variety of legal theories for challenging the constitutionality of
state school finance systems has been developed, and these theories will be
increasingly relied upon in future litigation. And as efforts increase to
introduce into the litigation the special needs of cities or of certain target
pupil populations-such as the physically and mentally handicapped and
students of limited English-speaking ability-it will be necessary to deal
with the question of whether there are "judicially manageable" standards.
177. Cf. Thomas v. Stewart, No. 8725 (Polk County Super. Ct., Ga., filed Dec. 19, 1974).
Plaintiffs challenged the existing school financing mechanism as being in violation of the state
constitutional provision imposing a "primary obligation" on the state to provide an adequate
education for all citizens. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1,para. 1.After the complaint had been filed,
the legislature passed a law which included a district power equalizing provision, designed to
eliminate the disparities in expenditures among districts resulting from differences in district
property wealth. The DPE provision was not made operative, however, so the plaintiffs have
returned to court contending that without the provision, the new law produces the same
inequities as existed under the old law. For a description of the case, see Lawyers' Comm. for
Civil Rights Under Law, supra note 70, at 7.
178. 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 894 (West).
179. Serrano v. Unruh, No. L.A. 30398 (Sup. Ct. Cal., filed Dec. 27, 1977).
180. 1977 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 894, § 19 (West).
181. Id.§ 32.
182. Petition for Writ of Mandate, Serrano v. Unruh, No. L.A. 30398, at 4-6 (Sup. Ct. Cal.,
filed Dec. 27, 1977).
183. Telephone communication with John E. McDermott, attorney for petitioners (Jan. 25,
1978).
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This question is brought sharply into focus as the emphasis in both school
finance suits and non-finance education litigation shifts from a standard
which requires the government to stop discriminating against certain groups
to one which requires the government affirmatively to overcome the "deficiencies" of such groups, whether or not these deficiencies were
"caused" by actions of the government. There are also likely to be differing
interpretations of equal educational opportunity resulting in a tension between those who espouse an egalitarian viewpoint and those who adopt a
more libertarian viewpoint.
Because of these unresolved tensions, as well as the many fiscal and
political factors that have been outlined militating against school finance
reform, the progress of school finance reform litigation is likely to be at a
slower pace than before and with mixed chances for success. Where legal
challenges are successful, the remedies that are developed are likely to be
less simplistic than in the past and more tailored-to the specific characteristics of individual states. Moreover, no single remedy is likely to be applied;
rather, some combination of remedies will be implemented, the particular
combination addressing the types of fiscal inequities that are most prevalent
in a state's school finance system.

